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SIGNING INITIATIVE PETITIONS ONLINE: 
POSSIBILITIES, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Many people expect the Internet to change American politics – most likely in the 
direction of increasing direct citizen participation and forcing government officials 
to respond more quickly to voters’ concerns. An initiative petition with these 
objectives is currently circulating in California that would authorize use of 
electronic signatures over the Internet to qualify candidates, initiatives, and other 
ballot measures. 
 
Proponents of Internet signature gathering say it will significantly lower the cost 
of qualifying initiatives and thereby reduce the influence of organized, well-
financed interest groups.  They also believe it will increase both public 
participation in the political process and public understanding about specific 
measures.  However, opponents question whether Internet security is adequate 
to prevent widespread abuse and argue that the measure would create 
disadvantages for those who lack access to the Internet.   Some observers also 
express concern that Internet petition signing would make qualifying ballot 
measures too easy and thus further distance the initiative process from the 
deliberative political discourse envisioned by the framers of the U.S. and 
California constitutions. 
 
Petition signing on the Internet would draw on the technologies and processes 
developed for electronic commerce (“e-commerce”) and “e-government” 
transactions.  Recent federal and California legislation authorizes the use of 
computer-generated electronic signatures for such transactions.  Registered 
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voters would be able to view and download information about proposed 
initiatives on Internet websites, sign petitions on a computer, and transmit their 
signatures over the Internet to be counted toward the total needed for ballot 
qualification.  For greater security, Internet petition signing would likely use 
“digital signatures” that employ advanced encryption techniques, possibly on 
“smart cards” containing computer chips, as well as state-approved “certification 
authorities” that vouch for the signer’s identity.  Digital signatures would then be 
decrypted and matched against the current list of registered voters under the 
supervision of state and county election officials. 
 
However, security problems of networked computers make Internet petition 
signing potentially vulnerable to fraud and other abuse.  Digital signatures 
protected only by passwords may be easily lost, stolen, copied, or otherwise 
compromised.  Similar vulnerabilities prompted the California Internet Voting 
Task Force in January 2000 to recommend against the early implementation of 
Internet voting from remote computers.  Internet petition signing may involve less 
risk than Internet voting, largely because a signer’s anonymity need not be 
preserved and officials could recheck a sample of signatures by contacting 
voters directly.  Moreover, the automated decryption and checking process for 
digital signatures may prove superior to today’s manual methods for verifying 
handwritten signatures. 
 
Although few e-commerce and e-government transactions in the United States 
today use digital signatures, smart cards, or certification authorities, the industry 
is investing heavily to enhance online security.  Given the commercial pressure 
to reduce risks and losses from large numbers of Internet transactions, 
identification and security methods will undoubtedly improve, and it seems highly 
likely that the commercial world will find workable solutions.  Additional efforts to 
develop Internet voting, both for government and non-government elections, will 
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also spur the development of better security approaches.  Even so, the security 
standards must be tighter for Internet voting or petition signing than for e-
commerce in order to maintain public trust in the election process. 
 
The costs associated with Internet petition signing include those required to 
issue smart cards, digital signature certificates, and encryption keys to voters; 
the costs of developing the infrastructure to renew certificates and to revoke and 
reissue them if compromised; and the costs of developing Internet-accessible 
voting lists for signature verification.  The initial infrastructure costs for 25 million 
California adults would be upwards of $200 million, with additional recurring 
costs of managing the system.  Once this infrastructure is in place, however, the 
costs of gathering and processing petition signatures should decrease, perhaps 
significantly.  Changes in absentee voting and other procedures prompted by the 
November 2000 election problems may also provide part of the infrastructure 
needed for online petition signing. The issues surrounding voting are closely 
intertwined with those for petition signing; consequently, future studies of Internet 
voting should also consider the implications for Internet petition signing. 
 
Although limited access to the Internet remains a problem, its magnitude seems 
to be diminishing over time.  Survey data report that more than two-thirds of 
California adults were Internet users as of October 2000 but that Internet use 
varies considerably by race and ethnicity, income, education level, age, and 
region.  Although these gaps are steadily shrinking, market and demographic 
factors alone will not bring all Californians online.  As a consequence, any near-
term implementation of Internet petition signing should include access provisions 
for those who are not connected to the Internet at home, school, or work. 
 
Beyond the issues of security, cost, and access lie larger questions about the 
effects of Internet signature gathering on direct democracy.  Would it encourage 
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greater and more informed public participation in the political process?  Or would 
it flood voters with ballot measures and generally worsen current problems with 
the initiative process itself?  Because we lack good data on these questions and 
systematic studies of them, today’s answers to them are largely conjectural.  We 
simply do not understand the full implications of using the Internet for petition 
signing or voting.   We can be fairly sure, however, that Internet petition signing, 
like Internet voting, will have unintended consequences.  That may be reason 
enough for many to oppose its early implementation in California, but it will not 
make the concept disappear.  Its proponents are likely to gain strength as young 
people who have grown up with the Internet reach voting age.  Internet petition 
signing seems to be an idea whose time is not yet ripe but is clearly ripening.  Its 
emergence on the political horizon should spur reformers of the initiative process 
to get on with their work before they are overtaken by events in cyberspace.  
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
 
“The Internet changes everything” is a mantra familiar to technologists, 
entrepreneurs, and the media.1 Indeed, the Internet has already transformed 
many organizations and business sectors and profoundly affected others.  These 
trends suggest to many that the Internet will inevitably change American politics 
– most likely in the direction of increasing direct citizen participation and forcing 
government officials to respond more quickly to voters’ concerns.  Certainly the 
dramatic vote counting problems in the 2000 presidential election have brought 
new calls for using the Internet in state and federal elections.2  Although 
attention has focused primarily on Internet voting, efforts are also under way to 
authorize the use of electronic signatures over the Internet to qualify candidates, 
initiatives, and other ballot measures.  An initiative petition is currently circulating 
in California that would submit such a plan to voters in March 2002.3 
 
Petition signing on the Internet would draw on the technologies and processes 
developed for electronic commerce (“e-commerce”).  It would also draw on the 
growing use of the Internet for disseminating government information and 
facilitating online communications and transactions between citizens and 
government (“e-government”).  Its proponents claim that Internet signature 
gathering will significantly lower the cost of qualifying initiatives and thereby 
                                            
1
 A previous version of this paper was presented to the Speaker’s Commission on the California Initiative 
Process 1n January  2001.  The author has benefited from helpful comments from Robert Anderson, Mark 
Baldassare, Max Neiman, Joyce Peterson, Fred Silva, Willis Ware, and Jeri Weiss.  I also thank the Public 
Policy Institute of California for its support.     
1
 An early example of this now-popular phrase comes from Cortese, Amy, “The Software Revolution: The 
Internet Changes Everything,” Business Week, December 4, 1995 
http://www.businessweek.com/1995/49/b34531.htm. 
2
 For example, see Cooper, Audrey, “Legislator Proposes Online Voting for California,” Associated Press, 
December 5, 2000; and Chambers, John, “Can Technology Fix Balloting Problems? Yes; Harness 
Strength of the Internet,” USA Today, December 19, 2000. 
3
 “Digital Signature. Election Petitions. Public and Private Transactions. Initiative Statute.”  Summary 
available at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/elections_j.htm#2000General; the full text can be found on the 
“Smart Initiatives” website <http://www.smartinitiatives.org/English/civiset.html>. 
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reduce the influence of organized, well-financed interest groups.  They also 
maintain that Internet petition signing will increase both public participation in the 
political process and public understanding about specific measures.  However, 
questions about security and access pose significant problems for Internet 
signature gathering, as they do for casting and counting ballots using the 
Internet.4  Some observers also express concern that Internet petition signing 
would make qualifying initiatives too easy and thus further distance the initiative 
process from the deliberative political discourse envisioned by the framers of the 
U.S. and California constitutions. 
 
This paper explores the prospects for and issues surrounding Internet petition 
signing in California.  After describing how voters would use the Internet to “sign” 
petitions and how their electronic or digital signatures could be verified, it goes 
on to discuss security, cost, access, and equity issues that pose significant 
obstacles to online petition signing.  It then outlines trends in Internet voting, e-
commerce, and e-government that may affect the development of Internet 
petition signing.  The final section discusses some broader implications of the 
Internet for the initiative process, summarizes the arguments pro and con, and 
concludes that while Internet petition signing is not ready to be implemented in 
the next election cycle, public pressure to authorize it will continue to build and 
could prove unstoppable over the next few years. 
                                            
4
 The Final Report of the California Internet Voting Task Force, convened by Secretary of State Bill Jones, 
provides a detailed discussion of security and related issues.  See Secretary of State, State of California, 
Final Report of the California Internet Voting Task Force, Appendix A, January 18, 2000; available at 
http://www.ss.ca.gov/executive/ivote/. 
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2. HOW WOULD INTERNET PETITION SIGNING WORK? 
 
Initiative petitions must receive a specified number of valid signatures from 
registered voters to be placed on the ballot.5  Proposals of Internet petition 
signing would change existing election laws to permit registered voters to sign 
petitions on a computer and transmit their signatures over the Internet to be 
counted toward the required total. Nearly all such proposals would permit signing 
at any computer, so long as proper security procedures were followed.  At least 
for the foreseeable future, however, Internet petition signing would complement 
rather than supplant conventional methods of gathering written signatures. 
 
Internet signature gathering requires at least the following three technical 
components:  
• One or more websites that display the text of the proposed initiative on the 
public Internet; 
• Means for voters to sign the initiative petition and transmit their signatures to 
the officials certifying them; and 
• Means to authenticate the signatures and check them against the lists of 
registered voters. 
 
Such websites could be run either by the initiative proponent or by state election 
officials.  Under current California law, no changes in a proposed initiative are 
permitted once it has been approved by the Attorney General’s office for 
signature gathering.  Accordingly, such websites should display the initiative in a 
format that is widely accessible but not readily alterable, such as Adobe 
Acrobat®.  Of course, these websites must be secured against hacker intrusion, 
                                            
5
 California requires signatures equivalent to 5 percent of the vote in the most recent gubernatorial 
election for statutory initiatives (419,260) and 8 percent for constitutional initiatives (670,816).   
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denial of service attacks,6 and other abuses;7 but these problems appear to be 
less critical than those of securely gathering and authenticating voters’ 
signatures on the Internet. 
 
Electronic and Digital Signatures  
 
Internet petition signing would build on the acceptance of electronic signatures 
for contracts and many other transactions as authorized under the 1999 
California Uniform Electronic Transactions Act8 (UETA) and the federal 
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce (E-SIGN) Act of 2000.9  
These laws basically state that a signature, document, or record may not be 
denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.10  The 
laws deliberately do not specify the methods to be used for electronic signatures 
or the level of security required.   
 
California’s UETA statute broadly defines an electronic signature as “an 
electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with an 
electronic record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the 
electronic record.”11 Thus, a customer can make a legally binding purchase 
simply by clicking on an icon shown on the computer screen so long as the 
                                            
6
 Although denial of service attacks are very real threats to election websites, they pose a more serious 
problem to Internet voting, which is conducted over a short period of time, than to initiative signature 
gathering, which is carried out over several months. 
7
 For example, hackers may be able to divert traffic from a legitimate website to one with a similar look 
that they have created; they could then fool users into revealing passwords, credit card numbers, or other 
personal information.  
8
 Uniform Electronic Transactions Act: California Civil Code, California Senate Bill 820, Enacted 
September 16, 1999. 
9
 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, P.L.106-229, Enacted June 30, 2000.  
10
 Wills, testamentary trusts, and certain other specified transactions are excluded under UETA and E-
SIGN. 
11
 Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, op. cit. 
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parties have agreed to conduct the transaction using electronic media.12  This 
kind of arrangement underlies much of the consumer commerce conducted on 
the Internet.   
 
The term “digital signature,” although often used as a synonym for “electronic 
signature,” more precisely denotes a technical approach for binding an electronic 
signature to a particular electronic record that includes protections against 
alteration or other abuse.13  Digital signatures use a mathematically robust 
method of encryption, known as “public key cryptography,” associated with a 
“public key infrastructure” (PKI), to ensure the integrity of electronic signatures 
and records transmitted over the Internet.14  Thus, for security reasons, many 
proponents of Internet voting and petition signing, including the backers of the 
California “Smart Initiatives Initiative” now being circulated, would require the use 
of PKI digital signatures. 
 
To use PKI digital signatures for petition signing, registered voters would be 
assigned a unique pair of private and public cryptographic keys by a public 
agency such as the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) or an approved private 
“certification authority.”15  The private key would be downloaded onto the voter’s 
computer or stored on a “smart card” containing a microchip, while the public key 
                                            
12
 E-SIGN, §101(c), states that the parties must have “affirmatively consented” to the electronic 
transaction.  
13
 Information Security Committee, “Digital Signature Guidelines,” American Bar Association, Section of 
Science and Technology, Electronic Commerce and Information Technology Division, 1996, 
http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/digital_signature.html. 
14
 Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, The Internet’s Coming of Age, Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press, 2000, pp. 5/15-19; and ________, Trust in Cyberspace, Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press, 1999, pp. 124-132.  California regulations approved in 1998 for digital signatures 
valid for use by public entities also permit the use of a technical method known as “Signature Dynamics,” 
which requires special hardware and expert handwriting analysis.  Because Signature Dynamics is more 
cumbersome and expensive and less secure than PKI, this discussion assumes that the PKI approach 
would be used for petition signing with digital signatures.  See Secretary of State, State of California, 
“California Digital Signature Regulations,” June 12, 1998, www.ss.ca.gov/digsig/regulations.htm. 
15
 The list of private certification authorities approved by the California Secretary of State can be found at 
www.ss.ca.gov/digsig/cert1.htm.  
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would be registered with the certification authority. A voter could then use his or 
her private key to sign a petition – either on the voter’s computer or on another 
computer or device with a smart card reader -- and send the encrypted 
signature16 to the initiative website.  Signatures would be decrypted using the 
public key registered with the certification authority and verified by election 
officials against the current voter list.  
 
Despite their mathematical complexity, PKI digital signatures are now used in 
some e-commerce and e-government transactions with relatively little added 
burden to either party.  Private firms have established themselves as certification 
authorities, and several have been approved by the California Secretary of State 
for use by public agencies.  The PKI digital signature approach to Internet 
petition signing thus appears technically feasible, although it raises a number of 
security, cost, and access issues which are discussed in the next section. 
                                            
16
 Technically, the “signature” is the result of a mathematical calculation using the bits contained in the 
private key and the electronic record (petition). 
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3. SECURITY, COST, AND ACCESS ISSUES  
 
Security Issues Surrounding Internet Petition Signing 
 
Newspapers regularly report the exploits of hackers who have broken in to 
supposedly secure computer networks, reminding us that perfect security will 
never be achieved in computer systems or any other human endeavor.17  
Internet petition signing is potentially vulnerable at several points and levels of 
the process.  Websites displaying initiatives can be altered, “spoofed,” or made 
unreachable for extensive periods of time.  Private keys are usually protected by 
passwords that may be all-too-easily accessible or otherwise compromised.  
Thus, a voter’s private key can be willingly or unwittingly given to someone else 
or copied remotely by a sophisticated intruder, who can then use it to sign 
petitions.18 Viruses or other malicious code can be introduced to copy a private 
key or substitute another.  Smart card readers can be similarly compromised.  
Individuals working for a certification authority, or election officials can be 
corrupted.  The list of possible security breaches goes on.      
 
These vulnerabilities are similar to those identified in numerous prior reports and 
discussions about Internet voting, such as the January 2000 final report of the 
California Internet Voting Task Force and the report from a National Science 
Foundation sponsored workshop on Internet voting held in October 2000. 19 The 
                                            
17
 For a sensible and accessible introduction to computer security, see Culp, Scott, “The Ten Immutable 
Laws of Security,” October 2000, www.microsoft.com/technet/security/10imlaws.asp. 
18
 As computer security experts have pointed out, digital signatures can only verify that a private key 
assigned to an individual was securely linked by a computer to a particular electronic document or record.  
It does not prove that the individual intended to sign the document, or that he or she was even present 
when the document was signed.  See Schneier, Bruce, “Why Digital Signatures Are Not Signatures,” 
CRYPTO-GRAM, November 15, 2000 http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0011.html. 
19
 Final Report of the California Internet Voting Task Force, op. cit.; Internet Policy Institute, “Report of the 
National Workshop on Internet Voting,” March 6, 2001, 
http://www.internetpolicy.org/research/e_voting_report.pdf. 
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California Task Force concluded that “technological threats to the security, 
integrity and secrecy of Internet ballots are significant” and recommended 
against early implementation of remote Internet voting from home and office 
computers.  Although the Task Force “did not consider Internet petition signing at 
any great length,” its Technical Committee was concerned about the possibility 
of large-scale, computerized, “automated fraud” if individuals could register to 
vote remotely over the Internet without appearing personally and showing some 
sort of identification.20  Regarding Internet petition signing, the Technical 
Committee report commented: 
 
Systems that would allow online petition signing from a home or 
office PC are vulnerable to malicious code or remote control 
attacks on the PC that might prevent the signing of a petition, or 
spy on the process, or permit additional petitions to be signed that 
the voter did not intend to sign, all without detection.  Hence, for the 
same reasons that we do not recommend Internet voting from 
machines not controlled by election officials, we cannot 
recommend similar systems for petition-signing until such time as 
there is a practical solution to the general malicious code problem 
and the development of a system to electronically verify identity. 
 
While there are similarities between voting and petition signing, it is 
important to note that the two are not identical and they have 
somewhat different cost and security properties: 
 
• Petition signing is a year-round activity, whereas voting occurs 
during a limited time window.  Hence, servers and other 
infrastructure needed to support petition signing would need to 
be running year-round, instead of just during a time window 
before election day.  This may dramatically increase the total 
cost of managing the system. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
See also Shamos, Michael Ian, “Electronic Voting: Evaluating the Threat,” 1993, 
http://www.cpsr.org/conferences/cfp93/shamos.html; Mercuri, Rebecca, “Electronic Voting”, 
http://www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html; and Rubin, Avi, “Security Considerations for Remote 
Electronic Voting over the Internet,” 2000, http://avirubin.com/e-voting.security.html. 
20
 Ibid., Appendix A, pp. 9-12. 
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• While it is reasonable to expect voters, for security reasons, to 
submit a signed request for Internet voting authorization each 
time before they vote (similar to a request for an absentee 
ballot), it is not reasonable to expect voters to submit such a 
request each time they wish to sign a petition.  As a result, 
voters who wish to sign petitions electronically would likely have 
to be issued authorization (means of authentication) that is open-
ended in time.  The longer such authorizations are valid, the 
more likely it is that some of them will be compromised, or sold, 
reducing the integrity of the petition-signing system over time. 
 
• Voters can sign any number of petitions in an election cycle.  
Hence, a compromised authorization to sign petitions would be 
usable for signing any number of petitions, magnifying the 
damage to the system’s integrity.21 
 
Although these three bulleted objections should not be minimized, e-commerce 
sites face similar problems and are successfully using encrypted electronic 
signatures to deal with them (see Section 4).  Of course, e-commerce firms can 
apply risk management concepts and tools to keep losses from security lapses 
at an acceptable level, whereas public trust in the initiative process may well 
require a higher standard.  The questions then become: How secure must 
Internet petition signing be to gain voters’ trust, and can that level of security be 
achieved at acceptable cost?  
 
The security implications of Internet petition signing are not entirely negative.  
Compared to present methods, it could also improve verification of voter 
signatures.  In California, county clerks now examine a random sample of 500 
signatures or 3 percent of the total, whichever is higher.  The results by county 
are given to the Secretary of State, who uses them to project a statewide total of 
valid signatures.22  With Internet petition signing, every digital signature, not just 
                                            
21
 Ibid, Appendix A, pp. 13-14. 
22
 “The Secretary of State projects the rate [of signatures qualifying] for each county, totals the projected 
valid signatures from all 58 counties, and qualifies the initiative if there are 110 percent or more of the 
needed signatures.  If the total falls between 95 and 110 percent, each signature must be individually 
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a sample, can be checked when decrypted to verify that the signer is a 
registered voter and has not previously signed the petition.23 Consequently, 
statewide results should be more accurate and available more quickly.  For 
added security, an automated query might be sent to a sample of electronic 
signers at their registered postal or e-mail addresses, asking them to confirm by 
return mail or e-mail that they actually had signed the petition. 
 
The Costs of Internet Petition Signing 
 
Advocates of Internet petition signing forecast dramatically lower costs both for 
initiative proponents and for county and state offices that process their petitions.  
Using paid signature gatherers, proponents now typically spend more than $1 
million to qualify a statewide initiative in California.24  According to Marc 
Strassman, Executive Director of the Smart Initiatives Project, that expense 
could fall “to the ten thousand dollars needed to build a first-class website, 
thereby allowing individuals and groups without million dollar budgets to 
participate in the initiative process.”25  However, initiative proponents would still 
incur the costs of circulating other petitions for handwritten signatures and of 
managing the campaigns of initiatives that qualified for the ballot.26 Nevertheless, 
significant cost savings are plausible once the infrastructure for Internet petition 
signing is in place. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
verified; below 95 percent, the initiative does not qualify.” Simmons, Charlene, “California's Initiative 
Process: A Primer,” California Research Bureau, California State Library, CRB-97-006, May1997, p. 10. 
23
 This verification process assumes that counties and the state maintain up-to-date computer 
voting lists, and that the digital signatures have not themselves been compromised.   
24
 Simmons, op. cit., p. 9. 
25
 Strassman, Marc, “After Florida, What?” Smart Initiatives Online Newsletter, November 12, 2000. 
26
 The Internet can also serve as a fundraising and organizing tool for initiative proponents (and 
opponents) once a measure has been qualified.  Both political candidates and organized interest 
groups are already making effective use of the Internet for these purposes. 
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How much would the infrastructure cost, and who would pay for it?  Marc 
Strassman estimates that the initial cost to the state of providing smart cards and 
digital certificates for roughly 25 million California adults would be less than $200 
million, or about $8 per person.27 This figure does not include the cost of smart 
card readers, which are widely available in cell phones and point-of-sale 
terminals in Europe and parts of Asia but not yet in the United States. The U.S. 
lag results in large part from our pervasive use of credit cards that are routinely 
and inexpensively checked over the telephone network for each transaction.  
This practice has so far obviated the need for more costly smart cards.   
 
A smart card reader costs between $40 and $80 if bought as a separate unit but 
only $10 to $20 each if purchased in large quantities and integrated into cell 
phones or personal computers (PCs).28 Hardly any PCs sold in the U.S. now 
come equipped with smart card readers, however, and PC manufacturers are 
unlikely to include them as standard features in the next few years.  Using a cell 
phone or other mobile device equipped with a smart card reader to access the 
Internet is a likely scenario for consumer transactions; but this scenario is rather 
less likely for petition signing.  As a consequence, ensuring general public 
access to smart card readers might require the state to purchase thousands of 
card readers, which it would then connect to the Internet at public kiosks, 
libraries, government offices, and other places where petitions could be signed.  
 
Once a PKI infrastructure is in place, there will be continuing costs to manage 
the certification process for digital signatures.  Certificates should be renewed on 
a regular basis to deter the potential fraud problems identified by the California 
Internet Voting Task Force.  If an individual’s private key is lost or compromised, 
                                            
27
 Strassman, Marc, “Fuzzy Math for Smart Initiatives,” Smart Initiatives Online Newsletter, December 14, 
2000. 
28
 Davis, Donald, “Where There's A Web, There's A Way,” CardTechnology.com, October 2000 
http://www.cardtech.faulknergray.com/news.htm.  
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it must be revoked and a new key pair and certificate issued.  Moreover, the list 
of revoked certificates must be distributed promptly to election officials and 
anyone else who might rely on their authenticity. These recurring costs are 
difficult to estimate today because no PKI system of the proposed size is 
operational.   The costs could be significantly lower if the key pairs and 
certificates issued for petition signing were also used for other public or private 
transactions, but this arrangement would further increase the risks of 
compromise and fraud.29 
 
Developing secure, up-to-date, and Internet-accessible voting lists for checking 
and verifying digital signatures represents another cost to state and county 
government.  Satisfying all three criteria is not a trivial task and would likely 
involve substantial expense.  However, it is not wholly unprecedented; Michigan 
has recently built an integrated statewide computer system for cross-checking 
voter records.30  California’s voting lists also appear to be in better shape than 
those of many other states.  Once Internet-accessible voter lists were available 
and election officials were trained to use them, the cost of verifying signatures 
should drop appreciably below that for the existing labor-intensive method.31 
 
Access and Equity Issues 
 
A persistent objection to Internet petition signing is that it would create further 
disadvantages for the poor, minorities, and people with disabilities who do not 
have easy access to computers and the Internet.  If online signature gathering 
makes it cheaper and easier to qualify initiatives, the argument goes, it will favor 
                                            
29
 Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, Trust in Cyberspace, op. cit., p. 131. 
30
 Harwood, John, “Fixing the Electoral System: Lessons From States Hold Hope for Reform,” The Wall 
Street Journal, December 22, 2000. 
31
 Strassman, “Fuzzy Math…,” op. cit., reports cost estimates from California county officials of 60 cents 
to one dollar per signature for manual checking and verification. 
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the wealthy, highly educated, and mostly white voters who already have Internet 
connections at home and work.  
 
Overall, Californians rank well above the national averages in terms of computer 
and Internet use.  Surveys conducted by the Public Policy Institute of California 
(PPIC) indicate that as of October 2000, 68 percent of California adults were 
using the Internet compared with 60 percent of all U.S. adults.32  More than half 
(51 percent) of the adults surveyed reported that they went online “often,” a 
substantial increase from 43 percent in December 1999. 
 
Even so, the most recent national33 and California34 data show substantial 
differences in computer ownership and Internet use according to race or 
ethnicity, income, education level, age, and region.  Among California adults, 
differences of more than 10 percent in Internet use separate Blacks and Latinos 
from Asians and non-Hispanic whites (Table 1). And to no one’s surprise, 
Internet use is characterized by a large generation gap: Californians between the 
ages of 18 and 64 are two and a half times more likely to use the Internet than 
those over 65. 
 
In many respects, however, the “digital divide” has narrowed appreciably in the 
past two years.  According to national data, the gender gap among Internet 
users has essentially disappeared.35  In California, the gap between Latinos and 
non-Hispanic whites who have been to college has nearly closed, although it 
                                            
32
 The results from seven statewide surveys of California adults from September 1999 to October 2000 
are available on the PPIC website http://www.ppic.org.  
33
 National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), Falling Through the Net: Toward 
Digital Inclusion, U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000, http://search.ntia.doc.gov/pdf/fttn00.pdf. 
34
 Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC), “California’s Digital Divide,” November 2000, 
http://www.ppic.org/facts/digital.nov00.pdf; “PPIC Statewide Survey: Californians and Their Government--
October 2000,”  pp. 27-28, http://www/ppic.org/publications/CalSurvey15/survey15.pdf. 
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remains for those without some college education.36  The generation gap is also 
shrinking steadily, but it will probably take two to four years before more than half 
of Californians age 65 and over are Internet users.37  Given these remaining 
disparities, any near-term implementation of Internet petition signing should 
include access provisions for those who are not connected to the Internet. 
 
 
Table 1. Percentage of California Adults Using Computers and the Internet 
 
Category Computer Users Internet Users 
 
All California adults 78* % 68* %  
                                                     
Race/Ethnicity 
 Non-Hispanic White 80* 71*   
 Asian 91 82  
 Black 76 60  
 Latino 71* 56*  
 
Income   
 Under $20,000 48 33  
 $20,000 – 59,000 76 62  
 $60,000 and above 93 85  
                                                     
Education 
 High school or less 56 39   
 Some college 81 68   
 College graduate 89 81  
  
                                                                                                                                             
35
 Results from a national survey conducted in August 2000 showed only a 0.2 percent difference 
between men and women using the Internet.  National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration, op. cit., p. xvi. 
36
 Public Policy Institute of California, “California’s Digital Divide,” op. cit. The NTIA study finds that, 
among Blacks and Hispanic households at the national level, lower income and education appear to 
account for about two thirds of the reported gaps. National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
37
 According to the NTIA national data, in the 20 months between December 1998 and August 2000, 
Internet use among those aged 62 to 65 increased by more than 60 percent. Ibid., Figure II-2, p. 36.  
Applying this growth rate to Californians aged 62 to 65, whose participation is already greater than 28 
percent, suggests that a majority of Californians aged 65 and over will be Internet users within three years.   
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Age 
18-64 83 70 
65+ 39 28 
 
Region 
San Francisco Bay Area 82 72 
Los Angeles County 74 59 
Southern California 77 66 
Central Valley 72 61 
 
 *  PPIC survey data from October 2000.  All other figures are averages from 
seven PPIC surveys between September 1999 and October 2000. 
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 4. IS INTERNET PETITION SIGNING INEVITABLE?  TRENDS IN INTERNET 
VOTING, E-COMMERCE, AND E-GOVERNMENT 
 
Proponents of Internet signature gathering argue that the Internet is an 
unstoppable force that is transforming all private and public sector activities and 
will soon be used for petition signing, voting, and other political processes.  
Because this outcome is inevitable, they contend, citizens and government 
officials should start planning to integrate Internet petition signing into the 
political system in ways that will best support core democratic values. This 
section discusses trends and developments in Internet voting, e-commerce, and 
e-government and the extent to which they may spur public interest in and 
acceptance of Internet petition signing. 
 
Internet Voting in Government Elections 
 
Internet voting in U.S. elections dates back to 1997, when astronaut David Wolf 
had his ballot e-mailed from his local election district in Texas to the Russian 
space station Mir, where he was temporarily assigned.38  Three years later, few 
Internet votes were officially counted in the 2000 elections, but the topic is 
receiving considerable attention in the press and among citizen groups and 
public officials. 
 
In a pilot project conducted by the Department of Defense, some 84 overseas 
military service personnel cast absentee ballots over the Internet in the 2000 
presidential election.  Using PKI encryption over secure circuits developed for 
military communications, the ballots were sent electronically to voting officials in 
four states – Florida, South Carolina, Texas and Utah – and were counted along 
                                            
38
 Counting Wolf’s vote required passage of special legislation by the Texas legislature.  See “Hurtling 
Toward Cyber-Elections,”  Voting Integrity Project, 1999,  
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with other absentee ballots. Although criticized in Congress for its high cost, the 
pilot project “maintained the integrity if the electoral process, and in many 
respects posed fewer risks to election integrity than the current [overseas] 
absentee by-mail process,” according to a DOD sponsored assessment.39 The 
project director called it ”a resounding success.”  
 
A significantly larger test took place in the March 2000 Arizona Democratic 
primary, in which nearly 40,000, or 46 percent, of the 86,000 votes were cast 
over the Internet.40 Registered Democrats received a unique Personal 
Identification Number (PIN) in the mail and could vote from computers at 124 
public polling places as well as from their homes or offices.  Internet voters 
entered their PINs along with their names and addresses when they logged onto 
the primary website, and the information was checked against the voter 
registration list and assigned PINs.  Digital signatures and other encryption 
techniques were not used.  The binding primary election was administered by 
election.com, a for-profit firm specializing in Internet voting.  Some technical 
problems arose during the four-day period for Internet voting;41 but according to 
the company, no significant security breaches occurred.  Voter participation was 
substantially higher than that for the 1996 Presidential primary, and the Arizona 
Democratic Party seems quite satisfied with the results.  Others, however, have 
criticized the Arizona Democratic primary for its lack of strong security measures 
and election official oversight of those who voted online from remote 
computers.42 
                                                                                                                                             
http://www.voting-integrity.org/projects/votingtechnology/internetvoting/ivp_3_hurtling.htm. 
39
 Department of Defense, “Voting Over the Internet: Pilot Project Assessment Report,” June 2001,  
p. 4-2, http://www.fvap.ncr.gov/voireport.pdf. 
40
 election.com, “Arizonans Register Overwhelming Support for Online Voting,” March 12, 2000, 
http://votation.com/us/pressroom/pr2000/0312.htm.  Besides the 46 percent who used the Internet, 32 
percent voted by mail and 24 percent went in person to the polls. 
41
 Jesdanun, Anick, “Resistance Continues for Web Voting,” San Jose Mercury News, October 26, 2000. 
42
 For example, see Tillett, L. Scott, “Will Internet Improve Voting?” Internet Week Online, November 17, 
2000, http://www.internetweek,com/lead/lead111700.htm. 
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California has taken a more cautious approach.  Citing the security concerns of 
the Internet Voting Task Force report issued in January 2000, Governor Gray 
Davis vetoed a bill in September that would have authorized binding trials of 
Internet voting in state and local elections.  Instead, prior to the November 2000 
election, four California counties – Contra Costa, Sacramento, San Mateo and 
San Diego – conducted non-binding tests of Internet voting from computers 
located at polling places.  According to VoteHere.net, the firm administering the 
trials in Sacramento and San Diego counties,43 voters found the system easy to 
use, “8 out of 10 said they preferred Internet voting to the current system, and … 
65 percent said they would vote from home if they thought the system was 
secure.”44 
 
As a result of the slow counts and other problems encountered with absentee 
ballots in the November 2000 election, some Internet voting advocates are now 
focusing on allowing absentee voters to use the Internet rather than the mails.  
This would be consistent with the conclusion reached by the Internet Voting Task 
Force that “it is technologically possible to utilize the Internet to develop an 
additional method of voting that would be at least as secure from vote-tampering 
as the current absentee ballot process in California.”45  Improving the security 
and integrity of absentee voting seems a high priority for election reform,46 which 
may create an opening for early tests of Internet voting by absentees.  Given that 
the percentage of California absentee ballots has grown from 6 percent in 1980 
                                            
43Safevote, Inc. and Election Systems and Software ran the Internet voting trials in Contra Costa and San 
Mateo counties, respectively. 
44
 Schwartz, John, “E-Voting: Its Day Has Not Come Just Yet,” The New York Times, November 27, 2000 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/27/technology/27CHAD.html>.   
45
 Final Report of the California Internet Voting Task Force, op. cit., p.1.  
46
 Absentee voting has relatively little protection against fraud and other abuses. See, for example, 
Simpson, Glenn R. and Evan Perez, “’Brokers’ Exploit Absentee Voters; Elderly Are Top Targets for 
Fraud,” The Wall Street Journal, December 19, 2000. 
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to 24.5 percent in 2000,47 Internet voting would have the potential to grow rapidly 
once authorized.  Oregon, where the November 2000 election was conducted 
entirely by mail, is also looking into the possibility of online voting.   
 
Internet Voting in Non-Government Elections 
 
Meanwhile, Internet voting has found new niches in the private and nonprofit 
sectors.  Many publicly traded U.S. corporations, which are required to conduct 
annual shareholder elections for directors and on other proposals, now permit 
and encourage proxy voting over the Internet.  The number of investors voting 
online has more than doubled each year for the past three years and in 2000 
constituted about 15 percent of all voting shareholders.48   
 
Other organizations such as credit unions, labor unions, professional societies, 
and university student governments are beginning to hold their elections online.  
Probably the largest such effort to date was the October 2000 direct election of 
five at-large members to the international governing board of the nonprofit 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).  The Markle 
Foundation gave $500,000 to ICANN and other organizations to support the 
Internet vote, which was managed by election.com. Anyone at least 16 years old 
could register with ICANN by providing a permanent mailing address and e-mail 
address.  ICANN then mailed an encrypted PIN to the individual, which 
functioned much like a digital signature to verify that the person was registered 
when he or she logged on to vote. 
 
                                            
47
 Bustillo, Miguel, “Rise in Use of Absentee Ballot Alters Tactics as Election Day Nears,” Los Angeles 
Times, November 3, 2000; Secretary of State, State of California, “Jones Officially Certifies California 
Election Results,” December 15, 2000.  
http://www.ss.ca.gov/executive/press_releases/2000/00-131.htm. 
48
 Nathan, Sara, “More Investors Click To Cast Proxy Votes,” USA Today, March 27, 2000. 
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Of the 76,000 individuals who registered as ICANN at-large members, 34,035 or 
nearly 45 percent voted during the 10-day voting period.  Frank Fatone, Chief of 
Election Services for election.com, commented: “45% represents a significantly 
higher turnout than other private sector elections… We usually see 13-
18%…turnout in elections of this type.  Use of the Internet clearly had a positive 
impact on participation in the ICANN election.”49  However, some technical 
glitches occurred:   
 
During the first twelve hours of the 10-day voting period, some 
2,800 of the 76,000+ At Large members encountered an error 
message when attempting to submit their votes.  The difficulty was 
caused by the interaction of election.com’s voting system with 
ICANN’s encryption routine… The situation was identified and 
corrected within the first 12 hours of the voting period.  ICANN 
members that were affected by the situation were notified 
immediately via e-mail, and were directed to log on and cast their 
vote.  Of the 2,800 people who received an error on their first 
attempt, 2,685 returned to the site and successfully cast their 
votes.50 
 
The ICANN election shows that Internet voting with digital signatures can work 
with large numbers of dispersed voters, but also that technical problems are 
likely to arise in the early implementations.  These problems would have to be 
solved before online voting is used widely in binding government elections.  As 
Zoe Baird, president of the Markle Foundation, said afterwards: “[The ICANN 
election was] far from perfect…It is now imperative that the data from this 
election experiment be thoroughly analyzed and available for public scrutiny so 
that the dialogue can continue and the system can be improved.”51 
 
                                            
49
 election.com, “ICANN and election.com Announce Results for First Worldwide Online Vote,” October 
10, 2000, http://www.election.com/us/pressroom/pr2000/1010.htm. 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 Markle Foundation, “ICANN Elections: An Important Moment for Internet Governance,” October 11, 
2000, http://www.markle.org/news/Release.200010111248.1872.html. 
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Managing Internet voting for corporations and non-government organizations 
represents an important near-term source of learning and revenue for 
electon.com and other firms such as Election Systems and Software, Safevote, 
Inc. and VoteHere.net.  These firms expect to apply their experience to online 
government elections, and they would be well positioned to bid on support 
contracts for Internet petition signing as well. 
 
Online Security for E-Commerce and E-Government Applications 
 
Despite well-publicized failures of online retailers, Internet shopping continues to 
grow.  A UCLA survey conducted in Spring 2000 found that more than half (51 
percent) of U.S. Internet users have made purchases online.52 The PPIC survey 
in October 2000 reported that 59 percent of California adults who use the 
Internet went online “to purchase goods or services.”53  For many young (and 
some older) adults, Internet shopping has become a familiar part of their daily 
lives. 
 
As consumer online purchasing expands, e-commerce firms are seriously 
investing in identification and encryption to enhance security and generate 
customer trust. Shopping websites typically use registered passwords for 
identification and “secure socket layer” (SSL) encryption for transmitting credit 
card or other payment information.54 Websites that offer high-value transactions 
such as securities purchases, mortgages, and insurance may add PKI digital 
signatures backed by third-party certification authorities to verify customers’ 
identities. As a next step, online identification systems using biometric methods 
                                            
52
 “The UCLA Internet Report: Surveying the Digital Future,” UCLA Center for Communication Policy, 
November 2000, p. 10, http://www.ccp.ucla.edu. 
53
 Public Policy Institute of California  “PPIC Statewide Survey: Californians and Their Government--
October 2000,” op. cit., p. 28. 
54
 Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, The Internet’s Coming of Age, op. cit., p. 5/16. 
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to recognize fingerprints, faces, or voices are under development and appear 
likely to find acceptance among consumers.55   
 
Over the next few years, digital signatures and certification authorities developed 
for e-commerce will likely be used for such e-government applications as filing 
taxes, obtaining licenses or permits, and bidding for government procurement 
contracts, which still require written signatures. This change may require 
government approval of the certification authorities used in these transactions, 
which the office of the California Secretary of State has already initiated under its 
1998 regulations.56 Japan is also preparing regulations for ministerial approval of 
“certification services” under its recently passed digital signature law.57 
 
Europe is well ahead of the United States in its use of smart cards for e-
commerce and e-government applications.  The European Commission is 
overseeing a formal plan to develop smart card requirements for a common 
“European Citizen Digital ID Document.”   According to one Commission report, 
this development 
…will promote European commerce and online payments. 
Moreover, it will be a very important step towards e-government in 
the European member states. Another benefit is enhanced data 
security. The qualified citizen’s certificate enables strong 
authentication, encryption and digital signatures.58 
 
Europeans have been more comfortable than Americans with government 
identity cards, and the European Citizen Digital ID Document represents both a 
modernization and harmonization of existing national paper ID documents into a 
                                            
55
 See, for example, Power, Carol, “Consumers Favor Fingerprint Scans in ID-Verification Tests,” 
American Banker, December 22, 2000. 
56
 Secretary of State, “California Digital Signature Regulations, op. cit. 
57
 Government of Japan, “Law Concerning Electronic Signatures and Certification Services,” 
enacted May 24, 2000. <http://www.miti.go.jp/english/special/E-Commerce/index.html>. 
58
 Information Society Technologies Programme, “eEurope Smart Cards: Common Requirements,” 
Brussels, European Commission, December 11, 2000, §7.1.1, 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/istka2/steeringmeetings.html. 
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common European Union digital format.  No similar trend toward using smart 
cards for identification is apparent in the U.S., although credit card issuers 
continue to experiment with them.59 It is quite possible that the U.S. credit card 
industry will replace existing magnetic-stripe cards with smart cards sometime 
within this decade, in large part to improve security for online transactions.  
However, the actual timing of such a move is difficult to predict. 
                                            
59
 In September 1999, American Express launched “Blue,” a smart card targeted to “technology-minded 
individuals.”   As of December 2000, it appears to have had only modest success.  See “American 
Express Launches Blue,” September 8, 1999, 
http://home3.americanexpress.com/corp/latestnews/blue.asp. 
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5. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
To this observer, Internet petition signing does not yet seem ready for 
implementation in California or other states, but pressures for it seem likely to 
increase as more people use the Internet regularly to pursue their personal and 
professional interests, e-commerce, and interactions with government. 
 
Current Obstacles and Ameliorating Trends 
 
Security, access, and cost remain the principal obstacles to implementation of 
Internet petition signing.  The security concerns associated with signing a petition 
on a remote computer are very real and appear difficult, but not impossible, to 
resolve satisfactorily.  The continuing growth of e-commerce and new 
experiments with Internet voting will bring with them considerably more 
experience with digital signatures, biometrics, and other security approaches 
over the next few years.   Given the commercial pressure to reduce risks and 
losses from large numbers of online transactions, identification and security 
methods will undoubtedly improve, and it seems highly likely that the commercial 
world will find workable solutions.  Whether and when such solutions will be 
adequate to maintain public trust in remote signing of initiative petitions remains 
to be seen. 
 
As costs decrease and a new, Internet-savvy generation reaches voting age, 
equity and access concerns will diminish but not disappear.  Market and 
demographic forces alone will not bring all adults online.  Consequently, any 
decision to permit Internet petition signing should include access arrangements 
for those who are not connected at home, school, or work.  These arrangements 
would be consistent with the recommendations of the California Internet Voting 
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Task Force to provide Internet kiosks for registration or initiative signature 
gathering.  They would also have obvious cost implications for government. 
 
State and local government seems unlikely to pay for the needed security and 
access infrastructure solely for Internet petition signing.  However, the growing 
interest in California and other states in using the Internet for government 
operations and services will go a long way toward building that infrastructure.  In 
his State of the State address on January 8, 2001, Governor Davis officially 
launched a new state website -- <http://my.ca.gov> -- that provides a portal to e-
government services such as registering vehicles, making state park campsite 
reservations, and checking the status of state income tax refunds.  Hackers will 
surely test the privacy and security measures put in place for these e-
government applications.  As a result, it will be important to monitor, document, 
and analyze the ongoing security experience with e-government services, both to 
make these applications more secure and to inform any subsequent efforts to 
develop online voting or petition signing. 
 
Election reforms in the aftermath of last November’s problems may also have 
implications for petition signing.  One such reform could be to update and 
maintain official voting lists online, with offline backup in the case of outage, 
intrusion, or other problems. Although initial voter registration would still require 
tangible proof of identity, such as a driver’s license or social security card, 
subsequent changes could be processed online.  Michigan’s decision to link 
voter registration records to drivers’ licenses, so that a DMV address change will 
automatically trigger a similar change on the voting rolls, also seems likely to 
spread to other states.  Although such developments will not lead directly to 
Internet petition signing, they would provide much of the infrastructure needed 
for it.   
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The growth of remote Internet voting in the private and nonprofit sectors, along 
with more field trials in government elections, may further encourage other 
Internet applications in the political process such as petition signing.  Despite the 
forecast by one well-respected consulting firm that “all states [will] have some 
form of Internet-based electronic voting by 2004,”60 Internet voting must 
overcome many obstacles before it becomes widespread. Still, many voters say 
they favor online voting from home or work.61  Moreover, absentee-voting 
reforms may include steps toward Internet voting.  The issues surrounding 
Internet voting are closely intertwined with those for Internet petition signing, and 
future studies of or proposals for Internet voting should therefore consider the 
implications for initiative signature gathering on the Internet. 
 
Broader Impacts of the Internet on the Initiative Process 
 
Although the real effects of Internet signature gathering on the overall initiative 
process are as yet unknown, its proponents and opponents have focused on a 
few key points.  Proponents have emphasized the Internet’s potential to lower 
the cost and reduce the time required to qualify an initiative.  Opponents usually 
stress the security and access concerns discussed above.  Beyond these issues, 
however, lie more philosophical questions about how the Internet might influence 
initiatives and direct democracy generally. 
 
One important question is whether the Internet could improve the quality of, as 
well as voters’ actual use of, information about initiatives.  Critics of the initiative 
process cite the scarcity and superficiality of information available to voters on 
                                            
60
 Gartner Group, " Gartner Says All States in the United States to Have Some Form of Internet-
Based Electronic Voting by 2004,” April 11, 2000, 
http://www.gartner.com/public/static/aboutgg/pressrel/pr041100b.html. 
61
 “A poll by ABC News found that 61% of 18-34-year-olds would like to vote online.” Chambers, op. cit. 
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television and radio.62  In principle, the Internet is an ideal medium for presenting 
detailed information about specific initiatives and the groups supporting or 
opposing them.  Internet websites can also link this information to relevant 
commentaries and other sources.  Voters who seek information in greater depth 
than ballot pamphlets63 and the mass media provide would be able to find it on 
the Internet.64  As one example, California now requires all committees 
supporting and opposing ballot propositions that raise or spend $50,000 or more 
to file lists of contributors and contributed amounts electronically.  This 
information is then made publicly available on the Secretary of State’s website.65 
 
A related question is whether and to what extent the Internet will encourage 
greater and more informed public participation in the initiative process.  Initiative 
websites could include interactive message boards that stimulate public 
discussion and debate, as other websites now offer on nearly every conceivable 
topic.  It is certainly true that website message boards often spiral down into 
banal chatter or diatribe; nevertheless, many examples of sustained, spirited 
discussions on serious topics also can be found.  The Internet’s capacity to allow 
substantial numbers of people interact over an extended period of time could 
counter another central criticism of initiatives: that they do not foster a structured, 
deliberative political process so essential to representative democracy.  
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 Broder, David, Democracy Derailed, New York: Harcourt, 2000; Frickey, Philip P., “Representative 
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An interesting recent proposal would use the Internet for public discussion of 
initiatives during the drafting process so that the proposed language could be 
debated and modified before seeking ballot qualification.66  This proposal would 
require major changes in the current legislation governing initiatives as a way of 
developing a forum “in which the mix of professional and public voices could 
create a deeply deliberative process of public law.”67  Of course, others will make 
precisely the opposite argument, contending that the Internet favors non-
deliberative, emotional responses that only exacerbate the flaws of initiatives and 
other tools of direct democracy.  In all likelihood, the Internet can and will be 
used in both ways simultaneously.    
 
Perhaps the most significant question raised by Internet petition signing is 
whether its chief effect would be to worsen current problems surrounding the 
initiative process itself.  Lowering the cost to qualify an individual initiative could 
inundate voters with ballot measures at every election and might, in fact, 
increase the total sum spent on initiatives.  Along with sheer number of items to 
be voted on, the influence of money and organized interest groups could 
increase.68  
 
Such concerns about intensifying the negative aspects of direct democracy, like 
the hopes for a positive Internet role in spurring informed public participation, are 
conjectural.  We lack good data or systematic studies on these points69 and 
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simply do not understand the full implications of using the Internet for petition 
signing or voting.  The Internet can help level the political playing field among 
candidates and initiative proponents, but it could also exacerbate the influence of 
well-heeled contributors and organized interest groups.  It can inform and 
encourage participation among voters in ways other media cannot, but it could 
also stimulate and reward superficial, emotional responses.  It can be used for 
serious deliberation and debate on proposed initiatives among informed citizens, 
but it could also lead to an explosion of easy-to-qualify ballot measures with 
disastrous results for representative government.   
 
We can be fairly sure, however, that Internet signature gathering, like Internet 
voting, will have unintended consequences.  That prospect may be reason 
enough for many to oppose its early implementation in California, but it will not 
make the concept disappear.  Its proponents will likely gain strength as more 
young people who have grown up with the Internet reach voting age and see no 
reason why they should not engage in political activities online as they do in all 
other areas.   
 
Internet petition signing seems an idea whose time is not yet ripe but is clearly 
ripening.  Its emergence on the political horizon should spur reformers of the 
initiative process to get on with their work before they are overtaken by events in 
cyberspace.  
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